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The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and
Acquisitions
Donald C. Langevoort*
I. INTRODUCTION
One need not spend much time in business settings to observe that
reason does not always seem to rule. My own academic curiosity in the
psychology of organizational behavior started while I was still in practice,
in a law firm and then in government, recently having studied corporate law
informed by the law and economics movement of the 1970’s. This was a
time when even political progressives had become enamored with
marketplace solutions to regulatory problems (the wave of deregulation in
the airline industry, banking, etc.) and the rational actor model of
competitive behavior had taken a firm grip on policy analysis.
Even though I was a junior lawyer, I was fortunate enough to find
myself in a number of projects where I was able to observe (quietly and
without any hope of influencing) senior executives of very important
companies and very high government officials at work. I also paid close
attention to the senior lawyers who advised them. And my impression—
which later turned into a particular research interest 1—was that ego often
seemed the more compelling force in judgment and decision-making than
cold, hard rationality, and that senior subordinates were often enablers of
egotistical choice. The lawyers and executives I most admired were those
clever enough to prompt different, presumably better choices via flattery
and other influence techniques that left the top person’s inflated self-esteem
relatively intact.
Even then, of course, there was a large body of scholarly work in
social psychology and organizational behavior that questioned the
*
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See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior and Law, 81 Va. L. Rev.
853 (1995); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146
U. Pa. L. Rev. 101 (1997).
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assumption of pervasive rationality in competitive business settings and
readily accommodated pervasive egotistical inference and other cognitive
biases. Orthodox economics has had its doubters all along. Over time this
academic joust has turned into a remarkably fruitful research agenda. 2
While some interdisciplinary tension remains, the collaboration between
psychology and economics has become constructive and productive, under
the heading of behavioral economics. The genre often referred to as “new
institutional economics” readily incorporates ideas such as bounded
rationality, information deficiencies, transaction costs, agency costs, moral
hazard and the like into theories of behavior that depart considerably from
the Bayesean depiction of rational choice commonly used in formal
economic models. In turn, scholarship in corporate and securities law has
borrowed extensively from this new learning, especially in the last decade
or so, to try to incorporate limits on rationality into legal analysis of
corporate behavior.
What has become clear for both descriptive and normative analysis
is that incorporating insights from psychology into corporate and securities
law means having to climb four tall steps to gain plausibility. The first is
that what psychologists describe as predictable cognitive traits or biases are
not observed consistently even in the decision making of a single
individual. Most people are capable or acting more or less rationally
depending on a host of situational, emotional and other contingent
influences. As a result, we have to know much about the situation as well
as the person to make any robust behavioral prediction. 3
The
2

In the economics literature, an important symposium published in the Journal of
Business in 1986 set forth both the differences and common ground between the
traditionalists and the behavioralists, the latter having been particularly influenced by the
Nobel Prize-winning work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. See The Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 59 J. Bus. S181 (1986). For a review of how this debate
quickly diffused into legal scholarship, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L.
Rev. 1499 (1998).
3
Indeed, one of the fundamental messages of contemporary social psychology is that the
situation often matters more than the disposition—notwithstanding the so-called
fundamental attribution bias, which leads people to think otherwise. See, e.g., RICHARD
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF HUMAN
JUDGMENT (1980). As to context, one of the important contributions in corporate
behavioral economics called doubt on whether something as robust as the endowment
effect has significant power when decisions are made by corporate agents. See Jennifer
Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. Legal.
Studies 1 (2002).
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psychologically prudent answer to any question of how someone—e.g., a
CEO in a particular setting, or group deliberation by a board of directors—
will think or act is almost always “it depends,” which does not lend itself to
particularly bold or confident legal analysis.
The second big step to overcome is because the strength and
intensity of dispositional traits and biases observed in both laboratory and
field settings vary considerably among the population—some people are
more likely to display them than others. In other words, even if we know
the situational context, we also have to know something about the
personality and related dispositional makeup of the particular actor. 4 And
here is one of the conventional economists’ major gauntlets for
behavioralists to negotiate: people who become CEO’s, CFO’s and board
members are different from the average person, and, by hypothesis,
substantially more “rational.” If rationality leads to competitive success,
then rationality will be favored in the selection and promotion tournaments
that determine who exercises corporate power. To me, this is the most
interesting step in the challenge to behavioral law and economics, about
which I and others have written much. 5
The third step is institutional. Even if we decide that some
behavioral trait, such as overconfidence or emotionally-driven risk-taking,
is likely to affect executive judgment and decision-making, there is no
reason to automatically assume that it will affect the firm’s choices. Almost
all important corporate decisions follow a process—multiple people
involved sequentially, and often with group collaboration at various steps
along the way. We have to predict that the process will permit the bias to
survive, as against (presumably) strong competitive incentives to “de-bias”
individual shortcomings. Organizational behavior research has identified
common de-biasing mechanisms frequently used by corporations. 6
This third step can only be addressed empirically—psychology itself
stops being concretely helpful once we pass beyond small group behavior.
Organizational scholars trained in sociology push back strongly against
4

See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L.J. 67 (2002).
5
See, e.g., Organized Illusions, supra; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and
Discrimination from a Corporate Perspective: Grease, Grit and the Personality Types of
Tournament Survivors, in MITU GULATI & MICHAEL YELNOSKY, EDS., NYU SELECTED
ESSAYS ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION, vol. 3, at 141 (2007).
6
See, e.g., Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 Res. in Org. Behav. 1 (1998).
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excessive focus on individual cognition, claiming that broad social and
cultural forces, not psychological ones, are the proper subjects of inquiry for
thinking about the firm. 7 Unfortunately, sociology tends not to generate
simple, tractable behavioral models except when reduced backwards to
something like an economic (rational choice) approach, so that testing
hypotheses rigorously is difficult. Moreover, the empirical questions—
identifying whether outcomes are rational or non-rational and then trying to
isolate causal connections in a corporate choice setting of interest to the
law—can be extraordinarily complicated. Many instances of “poor” firmlevel choice can plausibly be characterized as either behaviorally
problematic or the result of simple, rational opportunism by corporate
insiders, i.e., an agency cost problem.
These are three high steps to climb but still surmountable if taken
carefully, as we shall see. But even if we make it that far, we reach the
normative question—so what? If some form of non-rational behavior is
commonplace, there is a prima facie case for intervention. Deciding what
that intervention should be, however, can itself be vexing. The challenge is
both ideological and practical. Research suggests that, especially among
those with a conservative ideological orientation, behavioral explanations
do not qualify as legitimate excuses, and the right remedy for cognitive bias
is to make the person (or firm) learn painfully from the experience. 8 And
even for those willing to engage in some kind of paternalistic intervention,
such interventions are very costly and hard to accomplish successfully.
Perhaps the most common illustration, which I and others have explored at
length, 9 is that corporate and securities law’s favorite strategy—more or
better disclosure—often fails when up against a well-ingrained,
7

For a useful response from researchers sympathetic to the use of psychology, see Barry
Staw & Robert Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in KEITH MURNIGHAN, ED.,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 350 (1993).
8
See Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both the
Disease and the Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?, 45 Admin. Sci. Q. 293
(2000).
9
This is especially so when a seller has an interest in taking advantage of the bias. E.g.,
Sendhil Mullainathan et al., Coarse Thinking and Persuasion, 123 Q.J. Econ. 577 (2008);
Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail
Investors and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 104348 (2009). In addition, there is a strong cultural and historical tolerance for advertising and
marketing techniques that are at heart mildly manipulative, making it difficult to excise
from business practice.
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institutionally favored behavioral bias. There may be places where a legal
or regulatory “nudge” can work, but many others where it has to be a much
stronger shove that judges and regulators will feel both ill-trained and
under-resourced to give and follow through on with respect to the expected
and unanticipated consequences. In other words, as we shall see, there
probably are places where corporate law recognizes the likelihood of
persistent behavioral biases that threaten shareholders’ best interests, but is
unable to think of a precise, legitimate, cost-efficient response and so just
ignores it. That is not necessarily wrong, even if it may seem lamentable.
II. BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS ABOUT MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Legal scholars have used psychology to analyze many different
problems—board of director group behavior in corporate law 10 and
marketplace “irrationality” in securities law 11 are particularly well-plowed
fields. With the notable exception of work by Jim Fanto roughly a decade
ago, 12 however, little attention has been given to integrating behavioral
findings into M&A law, even though some classic insights came from that
subject area early on. Most of the remainder of this essay will illustrate the
methodological challenges and opportunities described in Part I as it applies
to corporate M&A law. We are aided here by a number of recent and
thorough literature reviews by financial economists on behavioral
approaches to corporate financial activity. 13 In law, there is a small but

10

E.g., James D. Cox & Harvey Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 Law & Contemp. Prob. 83
(1984); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith and Structural Bias, 32 J.
Corp. L. 833 (2007).
11
See, e.g., Lynn Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the
New Finance, 28 J. Corp. L. 635 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits
of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev.
135 (2002).
12
See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in
Merger Decision-Making, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1333 (2001); James A. Fanto, Braking the
Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 Buff. L.
Rev. 249 (2001).
13
E.g., Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey, in B. ESPEN
ECKBO, ED., THE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE
(2007).
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helpful body of scholarship on the related subject of “behavioral antitrust”
from which to borrow as well. 14
The starting point here is a stark divide that exists in behavioral
corporate finance. 15 Classical orthodox law and economics on merger
activity assumes the rationality of both the managers (and directors) of the
subjects companies and their shareholders. Even if the latter is relaxed
somewhat, the assumption remains that the stock price will be set rationally
in an efficient market, and that the stock price will be the main reference
point for shareholder best interests. As a result, the possibility of irrational
individual shareholder behavior is unlikely to be of much consequence.
If, however, we relax the assumption of market price efficiency,
then things change dramatically. Ever since the high point of market
efficiency theory in the mid to late 1970’s, contrarians have pointed out a
number of anomalies in real world market price behavior vis-a-vis the
predicted world of near-perfect efficiency. 16 Among other things, there is
much too much trading behavior, too much volatility, and too many
instances of pricing excess (bubbles and crashes) to conform easily to the
efficiency hypothesis. To be sure, many classical financial economists still
believe strongly in efficiency and work hard to justify the observations as
consistent with risk-adjusted models of efficient pricing, but the assumption
is today at the very least heavily contested within mainstream finance, if not
on the decline.
We need not explore in detail what behavioral finance substitutes for
market efficiency: there is certainly no agreed upon model of non-rational
stock price movements (if there were, it would promptly be arbitraged
away). Instead, there are often conflicting predictions of overreaction and
underreaction to news, momentum trading, trading on pseudo-news and the
like, many of which can be tied to well-known behavioral regularities like
loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, the representativeness heuristic, limited
attention, etc. We can fairly assume that these traits are prompted by large
numbers of situational factors whose interaction can be extraordinarily
complex and contingent, making the “irrational” market seem fairly chaotic

14

See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline
and Legal Policy, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 482 (2002); Maurice Stucke, Behavioral Economists
at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century, 38 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 513 (2007).
15
See Baker et al., supra note --.
16
See sources cited in note --- supra.
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and subject to unpredictable mood swings. Numerous book length
treatments of this field are available. 17
For purposes of legal analysis, we need only assume that stock
market prices can diverge from fundamental value for sustained time
periods (either for individual securities, industries or asset classes generally)
and/or that market prices do not immediately impound all available public
information. We then lose confidence in market price as a discipline, which
was the primary assumption that motivated the bold predictions of corporate
law and economics in the 70’s and 80’s in articulating optimal (often
largely deregulatory) M&A legal policy—the celebrated work of
Easterbrook and Fischel, etc.
This takes us to the main fork in the road. Irrational markets are
plausible because they involve the participation of large numbers of smaller
unsophisticated investors (“noise traders”) who, under the right
conditions—particularly limited arbitrage because of short selling
restrictions and limitations—can have sustained effects on stock prices.
The smart money in the form of larger, sophisticated investors is generally,
though not inevitably, presumed to be more rational but unwilling or unable
to stem the tide of marketplace emotions. If we then assume rationality on
the part of corporate managers, there are opportunities to exploit. Most
obviously, there will be prices of individual companies that are depressed
temporarily vis-à-vis their fundamental value, which makes them vulnerable
to cherry-picking in the M&A market for less than a “fair” price18
(conversely, if it is the potential acquirer whose shares are overpriced
because of irrational exuberance, it is time to do a stock-for-stock deal 19).
If structural or governance deficiencies exist on the target side that lead too
readily to a sale, we may have an unnecessary and inappropriate transfer of
wealth to acquiring firms, with unfortunately collateral consequences to
employees, suppliers, etc. when the transactions are highly leveraged and
thus carries excessive risk.
17

E.g., GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW PSYCHOLOGY
DRIVES THE ECONOMY AND WHY IT MATTERS (2010); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED
AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING
(2003); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE (2000). The intellectual history of the efficiency-inefficiency debate is recounted
in accessible fashion in JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET (2009).
18
See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted”
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891 (1988).
19
See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. Fin.
Econ. 295 (2003).
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We see the source here of many of the debates about takeover
policy. The less confidence we have in market prices, the less we can trust
individual shareholders to make rational decisions about whether to tender
or not into a hostile bid. Collective action problems abound, and so most
market critics tend toward accepting the need for a shareholders’
“bargaining agent” to make a sophisticated financial analysis of the bidder’s
offer and act on their behalf. The poison pill is the mechanism of choice
here, which moves us quickly to the question of whether a committee of
independent directors of the target is likely to be a faithful bargaining agent.
Scholars and practitioners disagree about that. 20 An alternative might be to
force greater disclosure from the bidder and/or target upon the
commencement of a contested transaction and let the shareholders vote—a
strategy that relies on a number of difficult assumptions about both the
efficacy of disclosure and the rationality of shareholder voting decisions.
Again, this legal literature is so well developed that we need not dig
any deeper into it. It is enough for now to see the connection of the
behavioral finance literature and the unraveling of the law and economics
orthodoxy when stock prices become less reliable. But a second branch of
behavioral corporate finance relaxes the assumption of managerial
rationality instead of (or in addition to) assuming market inefficiency,
positing that managers make predictable cognitive errors either in bidding
for another company or in responding to a bid, in both negotiated and
hostile transactions.
This is a particularly interesting subject for our purposes because it
brings into play all four of the steps that behavioral law and economics has
to take to claim the desirability of some kind of law reform. M&A
transactions are extraordinary financial events and so receive deep and
sustained attention, not the kind of setting for “quick and dirty” heuristics.
They are negotiated by the most seasoned business professionals—senior
executives, aided by teams of lawyers and bankers—not your ordinary
psychology laboratory subjects. And they are subject to an extensive multiperson process of deliberation and approval on both sides.
To be sure, there are conflicts of interest and incentive deficiencies
that may distort decisions. Putting aside the “merger of equals” transaction,
companies either acquire or are acquired, which means a premium will have
to be paid to the target company shareholders (and perhaps pay-offs to their
20

E.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871 (2002).
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insiders as well). For some time, it has been well known that there are
incentives that favor acquisitions quite apart from strategy or profitability—
so-called corporate imperialism is an agency cost problem arising from the
fact that executive compensation and perquisites are more closely tied to
size than efficiency. Hence managers may prefer non-value enhancing
growth. And so, the empirical evidence that many acquisitions are “valuedestroying” in hindsight comes as no surprise. 21 But that is not irrationality,
and requires no keen psychological insight to anticipate.
There is, however, a growing body of work suggesting that the
agency cost explanation may not be entirely accurate, offering a behavioral
account of bidder overpayment instead. I will not try to summarize all the
research on this subject, but just offer an overview. One of the initial
contributions here was by a distinguished (and otherwise fairly orthodox)
financial economist, Richard Roll, who put forth his “hubris
hypothesis” 22—that there is something akin to a winner’s curse that arises
out of any auction-like setting because the winner will by definition have
the most optimistic valuation of the asset in question (and thus presumably
be an outlier). His use of hubris, a form of poor judgment, prompted others
to look more closely at the psychological make-up of the person who
controls the bidding: the acquirer’s CEO.
We noted earlier that there is no reason to believe that CEO’s are
psychologically similar to the general population; the standard assumption
has been that they are more cognitively adept and rational. But there is a
significant literature in behavioral economics—both theoretical and
empirical—that challenges that assumption and says that CEO’s, on
average, are likely to be both overly confident in their abilities and more
risk-seeking than a rational choice model would predict. In their overview
of behavioral corporate finance, Baker, Ruback and Wurgler offer the basic
intuition:

21

E.g., Sara Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring
Firms Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. Fin. 757 (2005); Thomas Lys & Linda
Vincent, An Analysis of Value Destruction in AT&T’s Acquisition of NCR, 39 J. Fin. Econ.
353 (1995); Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J.
Econ. Perspectives 103 (2001). The precise extent of the harm from acquisitions is open to
question. See William Bratton, Whither Hostility?, in Greg Gregoriu & Luc Renneboog,
eds., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY IMPACT ON MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 103 (2007).
22
Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986);
see also Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597 (1989).
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There are good reasons to focus on these particular biases in a managerial
setting. First, they are strong and robust, having been documented in
many samples, in particular samples of managers. Second they are often
fairly easy to integrate into existing models, in that optimism can be
modeled as an overestimate of a mean and overconfidence as an
underestimate of variance. Third, overconfidence leads naturally to more
risk-taking. Even if there is no overconfidence on average in the
population of potential managers, those that are overconfident are more
likely to perform extremely well (and extremely badly), placing them
disproportionately in the ranks of upper (and former) management. And
fourth, even if managers start out without bias, an attribution bias—the
tendency to take greater responsibility for success than failure—may lead
successful managers to become overconfident. . . . 23

This all follows fairly predictably from the tournament theory of
organizational selection and promotion: as skill levels become more
concentrated up the ladder, the winner of a contest among managers is the
one willing to risk the most—and lucky enough not to have it blow up on
him or her. 24 Overconfidence leads to diminished risk perception.
In a series of articles, Malmendier and Tate take this idea and test it
empirically against patterns of corporate M&A behavior, using a sample of
Forbes 500 firms from 1980 to 1994:
We find that overconfident CEO’s are more likely to conduct mergers
than rational CEO’s at any point in time. The higher acquisitiveness of
overconfident CEO’s—even on average—suggests that overconfidence is
an important determinant of merger activity. Moreover, the effect of
overconfidence comes primarily from an increased likelihood of
conducting diversifying acquisitions. Previous literature suggests that
diversifying mergers are unlikely to create value in the acquiring firm.
23

See Baker et al., supra.
See Anand Goel & Anjan Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate
Governance, 63 J. Fin. 2737 (2008); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational
Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968 (2002). There is an extensive experimental literature here, e.g.,
Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 306 (1999), as well as many large-scale empirical studies,
e.g., Mathew Hayward & Donald Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 Admin. Sci. Q. 103 (1997). This literature is
closely related to work suggesting that CEO narcissism has an effect on acquisition
behavior. See NIHAT AKTAS ET AL., CEO NARCISSISM AND THE TAKEOVER PROCESS, July
2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1638972; Arijit
Chatterjee & Donald Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic CEO’s and their Effects on
Company Strategy and Performance, 52 Admin. Sci. Q. 351 (2007).
24
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Thus it is consistent with our theory that overconfident managers are
particularly likely to undertake them. Second, we find that the
relationship between overconfidence and the likelihood of doing a
merger is strongest when CEO’s can avoid equity financing, i.e., in the
least equity dependent firms. Overconfident CEO’s strongly prefer cash
or debt financed mergers to stock deals unless their firm appears to be
overvalued by the market. 25

Of course, these studies have to identify overconfidence: there are different
kinds of metrics that have popular among behavioral economists who work
with large data sets, particularly Malmendier and Tate’s choice to use stock
option non-exercise as a proxy for overconfidence. 26 Recently, however, a
study by Graham, Harvey and Puri sought to dig more deeply and was able
to administer standard psychology tests to a large sample of CEO’s and
CFO’s, and then run regressions to identify correlations between personality
types and basic corporate financial decisions, including M&A. The results
confirmed the basic intuition that CEO’s, at least, are substantially more
optimistic and risk tolerant than in general. They also find a significant
relationship (making no claim about the direction of causality, however)
between these traits and the frequency of M&A activity, which they find
consistent with the hypotheses in both Roll and Malmendier and Tate. 27
Although the overconfidence-based theory is the dominant approach
in behavioral corporate finance, there are other provocative findings about
M&A behavior. For example, a recent paper by Baker, Pan and Wurgler
considers the influence of the target’s historic 52 week high (economically

25

Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence
and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. Fin. Econ. 137 (2008). See also Ulrike Malmendier &
Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. Fin. 2661 (2005).
26
For earlier work setting the stage for this preference, see Chip Heath et al.,
Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise, 114 Q.J. Econ. 601 (1999).
27
JOHN GRAHAM ET AL., MANAGERIAL ATTITUDES AND CORPORATE ACTIONS, DukeNBER working paper, July 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1432641. An
obvious question to consider is how this benefits the firm, so that firms are willing to hire
overconfident CEO’s. There are many answers in the literature. The dominant one is that
an excess of optimism at the top has positive collateral effects that outweigh the occasional
damage, such as encouraging cooperation and enthusiasm in the culture of the firm, or of
promoting innovation. See DAVID HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., ARE OVERCONFIDENT CEO’S
BETTER
INNOVATORS?,
April
2010
working
paper,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1598021; Eric Van Den Steen, Organizational Beliefs and
Managerial Vision, 21 J. L., Econ. & Org. 256 (2005).
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irrelevant old news) on both bidder offers and target responses. 28 With
respect to target psychology, their hypothesis is:
The most obvious application involves the disposition effect, or the
reluctance to realize gains relative to the reference point. While for some
investors the reference point is likely to be their purchase price, another
important reference point—and, importantly, one that is common across
shareholders—is the firm’s 52 week high price. . . . This logic predicts
that targets are more likely to approve mergers in which the offer price
approaches or exceeds the 52 week high. The S-shaped value function,
on the other hand, predicts that the further is the current price from the 52
week high, the less influence the marginal dollar has in terms of the
perception of losses. . . . Anchoring and adjustment may also reinforce
these predictions at the strategical level of negotiations over price.

With respect to bidders:
The bidder’s psychology can be affected by anchoring and adjustment
both directly and strategically. . . . The bidder may reason, if the target
was valued at that level a few months ago, shouldn’t we, with our ability
to realize synergies, value it above or at least near that same level? To
the extent that logic is employed, the 52 week high becomes an anchor,
and insufficient adjustment from that level becomes the norm. . . . A bit
more subtly, it suggests that since the bidder’s investors do not think as
hard as its board about the target’s potential valuation, they are less
biased by the anchoring phenomenon and so more likely to view 52 week
high driven bids as overpaying. Once a valuation is established, the
bidder must consider the minimum price that the target will accept.
Bidder boards advised by experienced investment bankers are likely to
predict that the target’s 52 week high will both be used as a strategic
anchor against them in negotiations as well as a reference point that their
own investors truly care about.

After considering a number of possible non-psychological alternative
hypotheses, they present data showing that the 52 week high exerts a
strongly disproportionate effect on deal outcomes, which they attribute
largely to the target’s psychology and the bidder’s anticipation thereof.
We could go on at length; there is much more in the behavioral
corporate finance literature that speaks to M&A activity either directly or
28

MALCOLM BAKER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRICING IN MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS, NBER working paper, May 23, 2009. Other work in behavioral finance
also considers the disproportionate effect of the 52-week high. See Chuan-Yang Hwang &
Thomas George, The 52 Week High and Momentum Investing, 59 J. Fin. 2145 (2004).
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indirectly. Going back to the hubris hypothesis and the winner’s curse, for
example, we can also find emotion (affect) based explanations for the
competitive urge that may produce excessive valuations on the part of
acquirers, and perhaps reactive devaluation by targets. 29 Commitment,
confirmation and sunk cost biases are also likely to come into play.30
Group-level biases (risky shift, 31 “groupthink”) may as well. The explosion
of psychological research on negotiation behavior in the past few decades
touches in many ways on issues of importance in M&A deal-making.
In addition, there is laboratory evidence to support the intuition that
cultural conflicts may disable mergers even when they make sense on paper
by failing to anticipate the learned linguistic and perceptual commonalities
that help coordinate productive behavior in the constituent firms but clash
and fail upon consolidation. 32 Here again, overconfidence and other
egocentric biases may well lead to a failure of prediction that
underestimates the difficulty in finding synergies and eliminating
redundancies when two distinct entities are merged.
But we need not go any more deeply into these because we have
enough for a prima facie case, at least, that behavioral economics and
behavioral finance have something potentially interesting to say to M&A
law. In other words, I think that the research in this area meets the burden
of proof on the first three steps of the analysis set forth in Part I. This work
takes seriously the need to focus specifically on behavioral traits as they are
revealed in high level corporate executives, not just the general population.
It addresses the problem of how such traits might persist—perhaps
flourish—in corporate settings by generating competitive gains that, on
average, offset the harms predictably associated with rationally risky
29

E.g., Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on
Motivation and Behavior, 111 Org. Behav. & Human Dec. Processes 139 (2010); Deepak
Malhotra et al., When Winning is Everything, Harv. Bus. Rev., May 2008, at 78. There
may be hormonal influences here, observable in merger-related activity. See Maurice Levi
et al., Deal or No Deal? Hormones and the M&A Game, 56 Mgt. Sci. 1462, 1463
(2010)(finding that younger CEO’s are more dominance-seeking in M&A activity than
older ones, and attributing this to the influence of testosterone levels).
30
See Vicki Bogan & David Just, What Drives Merger Decision Making Behavior? Don’t
Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t Change Your Mind, 72 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 930 (2009).
31
See, e.g., Kfir Eliaz et al., Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis, 96 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1321 (2006). As the contemporary literature points out, groups can be both
more risk seeking and more risk averse, depending on context.
32
See Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer, Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An
Experimental Approach, 49 Mgt. Sci. 400 (2003).
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behavior. And it is sensitive to institutional context, conceding that we
need evidence of problematic outcomes in the marketplace before the causal
possibility of heuristics and bias should seriously be considered. Of
course—and this is a point at which lawyers and social scientists often have
difficulty with each other—methodological rigor in research in the social
sciences cautions against too readily drawing generalizations from data,
even when the results are statistically significant: there are always
alternative causal explanations, risks associated with highly controlled
experimental design, and expressions the need for future research. Lawmaking, on the other hand, cannot wait for scientific certainty and must try
to draw best-available behavioral inferences from whatever knowledge is at
hand, even when it is incomplete. My simple point, then, is that when
coupled with evidence of poor outcomes for shareholders in many M&A
transactions, the work on behavioral corporate finance gives us enough
cause for the law to worry about the psychological risks we have been
describing, and at least consider whether there are interventions that might
help.
III. THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO THE BUY-SIDE PROBLEMS
We know that many mergers are value destroying, with cyclical
variations in average frequency. The research just described offers some
insight as to why these may occur. So how should law respond?
We should pause here for a predictable interjection from
conventional financial economics. As noted, there is also a plausible nonpsychological explanation for value-destroying mergers (an agency cost
story about empire-building) and so resort to a behavioral account is
unnecessarily complicating—outcomes are all that really matters. But for
legal analysis, this is simply wrong. Among other things, corporate law
tends to work with state-of-mind categories like good faith, gross
negligence, scienter, etc. that are necessarily cognitive in nature. For
example, intent or good faith standards might be of use in deterring M&A
transactions that are deliberately empire-building (the economists’
assumption) but not those generated by overconfidence or similar biases
that operate out of consciousness. We have to know something about the
underlying behavior in order to know what categories to use, unless we are
prepared to rely on strict liability—a strongly disfavored legal standard
given the close judgments and nuances typically involved in business
judgments.
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Thus we come back to the fourth of the steps described in Part I: the
normative choice. Staying focused on the bidder side of the transaction,
there are a number of possible interventions that could respond to concerns
about hubris, overconfidence and the winner’s curse: greater shareholder
say over acquisition transactions, greater independent director control, more
intense disclosure obligations or more searching judicial review are the four
most obvious. Those familiar with corporate law will know that none of
these is much of a check on value-destruction. While shareholder voting on
the acquirer side is sometimes legally necessary, often it is not—and if there
is no approval requirement, both federal and state law disclosure obligations
diminish as well. Board approval is required, but without any special role
for independent directors (in contrast to conflict of interest transactions,
discussed infra). And the business judgment rule puts in place a weak
rational basis test for judicial review, which can almost always be satisfied
so long as procedural regularities are followed.
Perhaps, then, corporate law is being psychologically naïve in not
trying to do more. My sense is probably not, however, and that there is
more to the disinterest. After all, there are a fair number of Delaware
corporate law cases where judges at both the Chancery Court and Supreme
Court levels have made astute-enough psychological observations to show
that they are aware of structural biases and egotistical inferences that can
affect high-stakes transactional judgment. 33
Rather, there are other reasons for what is probably fairly deliberate
disregard. One, of course, is that we have to have some confidence in the
efficacy and cost-effectiveness of the suggested intervention, and these may
be questionable for other psychological and economic reasons. For
instance, the law could insist on greater independent director control over
acquisitions, on the assumption that they are less likely to exhibit
overconfidence. That may be true, but psychology research has offered
many reasons to be skeptical of director independence as a cure for bias,
most having to do with the mix of reciprocity demands, low-powered
incentives and informational deficiencies that can produce excessive

33

E.g., In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003)(discussing many
motivations in judging others—“Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view
of human nature that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated
notions of the law and economics movement”); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293,
297 (Del. Ch. 2000)(questioning possibly unconscious motivations of directors); see also
note – infra.
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deference to managerial preference. 34 Greater shareholder approval rights
may make sense, but are very costly and introduce uncertainty into the dealmaking process—and one has to have a strong theory of rational and
constructive shareholder voting behavior to predict that the benefits will
outweigh these costs. Given the rise of institutional investors, who show
some willingness to counter unwise expansion plans by acquirer
management when given the opportunity, 35 this possibility is not out of the
question. But neither is it self-evident, and by and large voting rights are a
legislative rather than judicial issue.
As to the business judgment rule, deference has many familiar
justifications even if we accept that psychological biases may exacerbate the
problem of value-destroying transactions. The business judgment rule is
a rule of abstention based, among other things, on the lack of judges’
confidence in their own second-guessing skills—perhaps even a sense of
their own hindsight bias—and how labor and resource-intensive judicial
review can be if offered generously by the courts. Going back to the
discussion in Part I, there is probably some ideological “just deserts”
reasoning going on, too: shareholders who elected overconfident managers
have themselves to blame in some abstract sense, and to the extent that
executive overconfidence on average is a productive bias, shareholders
should internalize the costs of competitive zeal along with the benefits.
In sum, there are significant limits on judges’ ability and willingness
to incorporate behavioral insights into M&A law, at least on the buy-side.
So does that render this exercise trivial? By no means, because corporate
law is more than just about strategies of judicial or regulatory intervention.
The practice of corporate law and corporate governance—in which lawyers
are centrally involved—requires a great deal of psychological as well as
economic astuteness, and the rich body of behavioral M&A research can
and should inform how deals are negotiated, structured and approved even
in setting of minimal judicial review. Well-motivated independent directors
need, as Malmendier and Tate say, “to play a more active role in project
assessment and selection to counterbalance CEO overconfidence” 36 whether
34

E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797
(2001); but see note --- infra.
35
See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729 (2008).
36
Malmendier & Tate, supra. For evidence that a well structured board does in fact
counter executive-level overconfidence, see ADAM C. KOLASINSKI & XU LI, DO
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or not the law compels them to, and this research offers a useful assessment
of psychological risk from which to structure more intelligent questioning
of managers when they aggressively promote a deal. It is not simply a
matter of figuring out whether the managers sincerely believe this deal is in
the company’s best interest—the test, I suspect, that many naïve directors
too readily employ, and in which the company’s lawyers too willingly
acquiesce.
IV. TURNING TO THE SELL-SIDE: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The overconfidence and winner’s choice literature focuses on valuedestroying acquisitions brought on by acquiring company hubris, from
which target company shareholders (if not the target company as an entity)
presumably benefit. However, at least some of the insights can be
transferred to the sell-side with respect to negotiated acquisitions—e.g.,
managerial overconfidence among potential target companies potentially
frustrates deals that arguably should be made, and as Baker, Pan and
Wurgler show in their research, other effects like disposition and anchoring
and adjustment can work to influence seller behavior. Negotiated deals that
do not happen are by and large insulated from judicial review, however,
which brings us back to many of the same normative “fourth step” issues
just considered.
But judicial review does intensify on the sell-side in a set of M&A
transactions: defensive responses to hostile takeover bids under Delaware’s
Unocal and Revlon standards, and the entire fairness inquiry under
Weinberger and its progeny for conflict of interest transactions. This is
much too complicated a body of law to dig into deeply, 37 but worth a few
brief observations.
In these areas, independent director control and/or shareholder
approval take on much greater significance. As just noted, there may be
good psychological justification for this, though that is rarely mentioned
explicitly in the case law or the academic literature—fear of disloyalty by
target management in trying to hold onto jobs and the other private benefits
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS RESTRAIN OVERCONFIDENT CEO’S (Sept. 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573395.
37
Many have commented on the tensions and uncertainties in the law. See, e.g., Ronald
Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 Del. J. Corp. L.
491 (2001); William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (2001).

17

of control, and maybe by target directors as well, is the standard explanation
for the enhanced scrutiny in the takeover context. In going private
transactions, the controlling person’s financial interest in freezing out the
minority shareholders a low price is plain, and the assumption is that it is
strong enough to overwhelm any inclination of independent directors to do
right by the minority.
With respect to judicial review, the insight that psychology can offer
has to do with the subtle, largely unconscious process by which people
rationalize a preferred course of action as the right thing to do.38 Conflicts
of interest have a strong pull even when the most obvious sources are
removed—in other words, one can remove directly interested directors or
shareholders from the deliberative process and still expect a bias in terms of
transactional outcomes. Interesting psychological research has shown that
“gatekeepers”—even statutorily regulated independent auditors—are prone
to motivated inference when there are strong client or customer preferences
and some “wiggle room” for coming out the preferred way. 39 For purposes
of the standard of review, allowing too much discretion—giving
independent directors full sway so long as they act in good faith, for
example, or within some far-ranging zone of reasonableness—probably
leaves too much room for bias.
But here again, the reasons both for and against business judgment
rule-like abstention are complicated, and courts may well choose to look the
other way rather than engage in deep inquiries into subjective motivation
even when they recognize the psychological risk. The most important
message of this research is for those trying to manage the deal process in
shareholders’ best interest, who should recognize the pressures driving
members of the deal team—not just the most obviously interested parties
but the lawyers, bankers and accountants as well—and be demanding and
critical even when persuaded that they genuinely believe in doing the deal.
The same can be said with respect to disclosure of conflicts of
interest, which may occur (often because legally required) in many different
contexts. In a well-known psychology article Cain, Loewenstein and
Moore offered striking experimental evidence that disclosure of conflicts
actually both makes opportunism by the discloser more likely (because
38

This is occasionally remarked upon by the courts. E.g., Paramount Comm. Inc. v QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)(noting the board’s obsessive focus on completing
the original deal—“they remained prisoners of their own misconceptions”).
39
E.g., Max Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Nov. 2002, at 96.
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disclosure creates greater moral freedom to so behave because the subject
has been warned) and at the same time makes the subject more willing to
trust (because the act of disclosing is disarming, at least when it appears to
be voluntary). 40 Subsequent research has questioned the strength of these
effects, at least where the subject can hold the discloser to account later
on. 41 This remains of interest in the transactional setting, however, because
of the pervasiveness of disclosure and the variability in the level of
accountability.
Consider, for example, a Second Circuit case, Minzer v. Keegan, 42
wherein a controlling entity engineered a freeze out merger at a price
unpopular with many shareholders, who nonetheless voted to approve the
transaction, which was at least better than the prevailing distressed market
price for the minority stock. The conflicting interest was fully disclosed,
but the controlling party neglected to reveal a potentially serious inquiry by
a third party, who was prepared to pay more. The court held that there was
no liability even if that was a material omission, because the shareholders
had no power to compel the majority to consider the alternative bid—hence
the freeze out price was their only real choice. In other words, there was no
causal injury. Putting aside whether this was the right outcome, one at least
has to wonder whether the disclosure of the conflict let the controlling
person feel more freedom to cast fiduciary obligations aside, or whether
shareholders might have been lulled into thinking that the transaction was
being handled responsibly, in part, precisely because the adverse interest
disclosure was so clear.
V. CONCLUSION
Research in psychology and behavioral economics sheds interesting,
sometimes disturbing light on the processes by which M&A transactions
occur. Of course there findings are not limited to M&A. The same
research programs described earlier—focused on overconfidence, etc.—
have identified other corporate finance contexts in which similar effects are
40

Dylan Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of
Interest, 34 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (2005).
41
See Brian Church & Xi Kuang, Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure and (Costly) Sanctions:
Experimental Evidence, 38 J. Leg. Stud. 505 (2009); see also Christopher Koch & Carsten
Schmidt, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest—Do Experience and Reputation Matter? 35
Acct’g, Org. & Soc’y 95 (2010).
42
218 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000).
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observed. Relevant to the recent financial crisis, one can easily see how
hubris and excessive optimism can lead down the slippery slopes to both
excessive risk-taking and concealment of those risks from investors, where
the insiders may, at least for a time, themselves been blinded to reality. 43
Categories like bad faith and scienter may be very poor fits for these kinds
of situations, too.
As I have emphasized, there are limits on the ability or the
willingness of courts and regulators to confront the highly contingent,
situational nature of officer/director inference and decision making. But we
can at least hope that they will accept the main insight from the behavioral
literature, that rationality in corporate judgment cannot be presumed, and
often fails. Beyond that, the greatest usefulness of this research is really to
participants in the transactional process itself, who very much need to
understand better not only that human nature poses a deal risk, but how,
why, and under what circumstances there is reason to worry. 44
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See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the
Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Risk-taking in Financial Services, Cornell L. Rev.
(forthcoming, 2011); Malcolm Gladwell, Cocksure: Banks, Battles and the Psychology of
Overconfidence, New Yorker, July 27, 2009, at 24.
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